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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEw Yopx PRACTCE
"Self-help" Remedies and Due Process
The Supreme Court's ruling in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.'
that the ex parte garnishment by a creditor of his debtor's wages vio-
lates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment precipitated
a reevaluation of the entire field of creditors' prejudgment remedies.2
At the heart of due process, the Court held, are notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard.3 The reaction of a majority of states, including
New York, was to construe Sniadach as applicable only in situations
where the ex parte seizure would create severe economic hardship.4
Sniadach was thereafter clarified and expanded by the Supreme
Court in Fuentes v. Shevin,5 which held that procedural due process
must be accorded whenever a party is deprived of "any significant prop-
erty interest."" Armed with Fuentes, consumer advocates began an all-
out attack upon theretofore sacrosanct prejudgment remedies. Among
the summary procedures struck down as constitutionally defective were
provisional remedies such as ex parte orders of attachment 7 and re-
plevin," statutorily sanctioned consensual agreements permitting wage
1 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2For a review of the multifarious state statutes which have fallen in Sniadach's wake
see Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing and Fin. Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1835 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 456
F.2d 979 (Sd Cir. 1972).
8 895 U.S. at 389.
4 See 800 West 154th St. Realty Co. v. Department of Bldgs., 26 N.Y.2d 588, 544, 260
N.E.2d 584, 587, 811 N.Y.S.2d 899, 908 (1970).
5 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
6 Id. at 87. Only extraordinary circumstances, the Court felt would justify summary
ex parte seizure. In determining when such circumstances exist, the Court outlined the
following criteria by which it had been guided in the past to condone dispensation with a
prior hearing:
(1) the seizure need be necessary to achieve an important governmental or public
interest;
(2) a special need for precipitous action need be present;
(3) the one initiating the procedure need be a governmental official acting within the
guidelines of a narrowly drawn statute, who determines the particular need for its appli-
cation under the circumstances.
The following examples were cited: Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S.
594 (1950) (Federal Food and Drug Administrator permitted to seize dangerous, mis-
labeled or adulterated drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (summary seizure of
bank assets pending investigation of its operations); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921)
(attachment without notice permitted to secure jurisdiction or prevent a debtor from con-
cealing property). 407 U.S. at 90-92.
7 Richman v. Richman, 72 Misc. 2d 803, 839 N.YS.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1972), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L. RaV. 725, 748 (1978).
8Inter City Motor Sales v. Syzmanski, 42 Mich. App. 112, 201 N.W.2d 878 (Ist App.
Div. 1972); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
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garnishment or income assignment, 9 and landlord's, 0 innkeeper's"
and garageman's 12 lien laws.
In a recent decision, Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co.,13 the
Court of Appeals held New York's innkeeper's lien law 4 "irreconcil-
able with evolving concepts of due process" and therefore unconstitu-
tional.15 This statute permitted the proprietor of a hotel to detain the
baggage and other property of a defaulting guest without notice or op-
portunity for a hearing.
An act must be performed under color of state law before a viola-
tion of the due process clause can be found. Thus the Court was faced
with the task of finding the requisite state action in the innkeeper's
seizure. Writing for the majority, Judge Jasen cited two sources of state
involvement: (1) the line of Supreme Court decisions holding that
where a private individual receives encouragement or authorization by
statute to commit constitutional deprivations, this is sufficient to clothe
his action with the authority of state law; 16 and (2) the more recent
theory that the requisite state action for due process purposes exists
in situations where private persons perform traditionally public func-
tions.' With respect to the latter, since the execution of a lien had tra-
ditionally been the function of the sheriff, the innkeeper's execution
9 Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), discussed in text accompanying
notes 31-40 infra; Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Il. 1972) (three-judge court).
10 Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
11 Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Klim v. Jones,
315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
12 Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Quebec v. Bud's Auto Serv., 105
Cal. Rptr. 677 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles County 1973). See also Hernandez v.
European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973), which questioned the continued
viability of the sales provisions of the New York garageman's lien law permitting the sale
of the seized chattel without the opportunity for a prior judicial hearing. N.Y. LEN LAW
§ 204 (McKinney 1973).
13 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973), overruling Water & Co. v.
Gerard, 189 N.Y. 302, 82 N.E. 143 (1907).
14 N.Y. LIEN LAW § 181 (McKinney 1966).
15 33 N.Y.2d at 19, 300 N.E.2d at 713, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 173. Similar statutes were
found unconstitutional in Illinois and California. See Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F.
Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
16 33 N.Y.2d at 19-20, 300 N.E.2d at 714, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 175. The Court relied upon
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (constitutional amendment barring state limitation
on private racial discrimination in housing held to be state action); Adickes v. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144 (1970) (acts of private racial discrimination pursuant to state-enforced custom
held to be under color of state law for fourteenth amendment purposes); and Shelley v.
Kraemer, 344 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenant in deed
"bears the clear and unmistakable imprimatur of the state. . . ."). See also Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (lease in municipal parking structure held
sufficient nexus with the state).
17 See Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1970); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp.
183, 189 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (statutes vesting landlord with power to execute lien deemed to
grant him authority traditionally reserved to the state).
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of his own lien was deemed a sufficient state involvement to invoke the
procedural due process standards enunciated in Fuentes.18 Blye did
not, however, effect a per se invalidation of the statute but only an
emasculation of its prejudgment mechanism; the seizure must now be
prefaced by notice and an opportunity for hearing, absent extra-
ordinary circumstances. 19
Shortly before the Blye decision, the Supreme Court, Rensselaer
County, in Frost v. Mohawk National Bank,20 upheld the constitu-
tionality of the most controversial of prejudgment remedies, the com-
mon law "self-help" procedure embodied in section 9-50321 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. This allows the secured party to repossess
the collateral upon the debtor's default without notice or an oppor-
tunity for a hearing. The standard retail installment sales contract
invariably contains such a self-help clause.
The Frost court was able to sidestep the state action issue by up-
holding the procedure on the basis of the specific contractual authoriza-
tion.22 Furthermore, the section 9-503 clause could not be deemed un-
conscionable under section 2-302 of the Code because the two Code
provisions are to be read as consistent. 23
It would be presumptuous to view the later Court of Appeals rul-
18 33 N.Y.2d at 20, 300 N.E2.d at 715, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
19 Judges Breitel and Gabrielli dissented on the grounds that there was no issue of re-
curring public interest, that the return of the plaintiffs property had rendered the case
moot, and finally, that a time-honored statute had been struck down without considering
the practical impact. 33 N.Y.2d at 23, 300 N.E.2d at 715, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
The majority considered that the recurring nature of the controversy coupled with
the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages for mental distress prevented mootness. 33 N.Y.2d
at 19, 800 NX.E2d at 713, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 174, citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 US. 486,
496-97 (1969).
2074 Misc. 2d 912, 347 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1973).
21 N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-503 (McKinney 1964) reads in pertinent part: "Unless otherwise
agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In tak-
ing possession a secured party may proceed without judicial notice if this can be done,
without breach of the peace ..
2274 Misc. 2d at 913, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
23 It has been argued that allowing a creditor to avoid the procedural safeguards by
providing for summary repossession in the contractual agreement is a dangerous solution.
Once deprived of the sanction of section 9-503, the provision becomes vulnerable to attack
as a waiver of constitutional right (and thus subject to dose scrutiny under Sniadach) or
unenforceable under section 2-302. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972),
rev'd sub nor. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1973). The
district court in Adams felt that permitting contractual authorization could lead to the
widespread adoption of adhesion contracts:
If the provision of a contract can legitimize summary repossession, wage garnish-
ment might then be valid on the same theory, as long as a private agreement
could be shown. This would fly in the face of the reasoning in Sniadach and is
rejected by this court.
388 F. Supp. at 621. But even with the sanction of section 9-503, a creditor is not immune
from attack on the foregoing grounds. See text accompanying notes 78-79 infra.
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ing in Blye as having tacitly overruled Frost. While numerous prejudg-
ment creditor remedies have fallen in many jurisdictions, 24 both federal
and state courts throughout the country, with rare exception, continue
to sustain the validity of section 9-503.25
Generally, where the remedy depends for its enforcement solely
upon the self-help of the creditor, the necessary state action would ap-
pear to be lacking. Yet "state action" has proved to be a concept that
can be manipulated according to the interests the court deems worthy
of protection.
In Reitman v. Mulkey,26 a California initiative and referendum
produced an amendment to the state constitution affecting the repeal
of previously enacted fair housing legislation and prohibited the legis-
lature from interfering with an owner's right to sell, lease or rent his
property to whomever, in his absolute discretion, he pleased. The Su-
preme Court viewed the enactment as an indirect authorization of
private discrimination in the housing market and as erecting a state
constitutional barrier to the exercise of federal rights. Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis27 involved the refusal of a private club to serve a black
state senator as a guest. Here the Supreme Court found insufficient state
involvement although the state had granted the club a liquor license
and had required the club to enforce its racially restrictive by-laws.
Important constitutional cases thus hinge on whether a sufficient
state nexus is found. The different conclusions reached in Reitman
and Moose Lodge on this determinative issue can be explained in terms
of the interests involved: the minorities' need for housing, a basic neces-
sity of life, was deemed worthy of greater protection under the Consti-
24 See notes 7-12 supra.
25 The following federal courts have held the private transactional nature of the self-
help agreement to be unaffected by its recognition in the U.C.C.: Adams v. Southern Cal.
First Nat'l Bank, - F.2d -(9th Cir. 1973); Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Marquette
Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973); Baker v. Keeble, 362 F. Supp. 355 (M.D. Ala.
1973); Nicholas v. Tower Grove Bank, 362 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Shelton v. Gen-
eral Elec. Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Calvin v. Avco Fin. Servs., 12
UCC REP. SEv. 25 (D. Utah 1973); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb.
1972); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Greene v. First Nat'l Exch.
Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oiler v. Bank of America, 3,42 F. Supp. 21 (N.D.
Cal. 1972). States courts so holding are: Giglio v. Bank of Del., 307 A.2d 816 (Del. 1973);
Northside Motors v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973); Brown v. United States Nat'l Bank,
509 P.2d 442 (Ore. 1973); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402
(1972).
The following courts have held to the contrary, finding state action: Boland v. Essex
County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973); Gibb v. Titelnan, 13 UCC REP.
SEnv. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., 12 UCC REP. SEV. 543 (D. Vt.
1972); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Dinitz, 11 UCC REP'. SEav. 627 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County
1972).
26 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
27 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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tution than a local aristocrat's need to dine in an exclusive and "dis-
criminating" club.
In the field of prejudgment creditor remedies, Reitman has been
advanced as a touchstone for those who would surround a particular
statute with due process safeguards.28 But the courts should refrain
from too loosely analogizing from the area of racial discrimination to
the field of creditor remedies. State action is not a rigid concept; in-
deed, the invitation to fashion a precise formula has been declined
by the United States Supreme Court in a related field:
To fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state re-
sponsibility under the equal protection clause is an impossible task
which has never been attempted. . .-. Only by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
state in private conduct be attributed its true significance.29
Manipulation of the state action requirement has therefore effec-
tuated desired social policy in the equal protection area, and the same
approach has been followed by the courts in the due process field. Thus,
while there appears to be little procedural distinction between section
9-503 and other prejudgment remedies, courts have more readily found
state action with respect to the latter, as, for example, where the valid-
ity of the innkeeper's lien law has been called into question.
One rationale that has been advanced by the courts for their dis-
similar treatment of section 9-503 and innkeeper's lien statutes is the
divergence in origin of the two remedies. Section 9-503 merely codifies
a remedy that had long been sanctioned under the common law.30
Since the provision grants the creditor no new statutory right, the nexus
28 See, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1973).
29 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 265 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
80 UNiFoRAi CONDrTIONAL SALES Act § 16, Comment; 2 G. GILMom, SECURITY INTERESTS
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.1, at 1212 (1965); 2 F. PoLLocK 9- F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH L .w 574-77 (2d ed. 1898), cited in- F.2d at - n.12.
Professor Mentschikoff, a member of the permanent editorial board for the Uniform
Commercial Code, filed an amicus curiae brief in the appeal of Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp.
614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. She argues:
Section 9-503 simply recognizes this common knowledge of buyers on time that
repossession follows default and makes unnecessary its statement in the contract.
It cannot be that codifying a generally understood practice of ancient and honor-
able lineage and surrounding it with safeguards renders the practice unconsti-
tutional.
Cited in Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 11, 14, 295 A.2d 402, 406 (1972).
But the use of this "origin" approach was impugned by Judge Byrne in his dissent
in Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1973):
The State of California deliberately chose to follow a State policy of encouraging
the repossession and sale of collateral without a prior hearing. It embodied such
a policy in §§ 9503 and 9504. The creditors admit that they acted pursuant to
those sections when they repossessed and sold the collateral. The State meaning-
fully encouraged the repossessions and sales and thus became significantly in-
volved within the meaning of Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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with the state is attenuated. On the other hand, the common law ac-
corded the innkeeper no similar right of summary procedure and the
state, in enacting the innkeeper's lien law, may properly be deemed the
fountainhead of the right and responsible for violations of due process
that attend its exercise. But as courts continue to adjudicate the validity
of other summary creditor remedies, this distinction becomes tenuous.
In Bond v. Dentzer,8 1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld the validity of another New York self-help
mechanism, the assignment of earnings statute.8 2 By contractual provi-
sion, a creditor is authorized, upon default, to execute against the debt-
or's wages. The statute, like section 9-503, contains no provision for
judicial or other official interposition.8 Despite this, the District Court
for the Northern District of New York had struck down the procedure,
finding the necessary quantum of state involvement to be present. 84
Conceding that no organ of the state was actively involved in the sum-
mary procedure, Chief Judge Foley proferred three alternative theories
upon which a finding of state action could be predicated:
(1) When private and public interests combine for mutual eco-
nomic interest, as pursuant to a state licensing scheme, a "silent part-
nership" is said to obtain.85 Alternatively, by allowing the creditor to
circumvent the judicial process, the state secures an advantage for the
creditor's private interests by enhancing his economic leverage over
the debtor. In either case, though the private party be the dominant
actor, his acts depriving others of due process are imputed to the state.
(2) In the Reitman vein, the state's purported neutrality in fact
31- F.2d - (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 362 F. Supi. 1373 (N.D.N.Y. 1973).
82 N.Y. PE S. PROP. LAw §§ 46-49 (McKinney 1973).
88 Ten days' advance notice to the debtor is required but no prior judicial determi-
nation as to the fact of default is provided for. Id. § 48.
84 362 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D.N.Y. 1973).
85 Id. at 1378-79. The leading case propounding this theory is Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 US. 715 (1961), where a racially discriminating restaurant leased
space in a municipal parking facility, and state action was found. "The State has so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." 365 U.S. at 725, cited in
362 F. Supp. at 1378. See also Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 US. 144 (1970), where a racially
motivated refusal of service by a party was considered an act in conformity with a state-
enforced custom of discrimination and therefore attributable to the public or state interest.
Moose Lodge was deemed inapposite because there was no factual showing of "eco-
nomic mutuality." Yet even state regulation of liquor licenses could rise to the level of
state action, the court noted, when used as a means to secure an economic advantage for
private interests. 362 F. Supp. at 1378-79, citing Bennett v. Dyer's Chop House, 350 F. Supp.
153, 154-55 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp.
593, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
[Vol. 48:611
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encourages the parties to enter into this one-sided agreement and has
fostered its pervasive use in the small loan market.36
(3) The creditor, in executing on the wages, is performing a tradi-
tional state function.37
Having found the requisite state action, the court, relying on
Fuentes, held the adhesive contractual forms to be ineffective as a
waiver of constitutional rights.38 The court noted that even by common
law standards the wage assignment statute violated due process as
traditional prejudgment seizure had always been prefaced by at least
cursory official review of the merits of the claim.39 The court appeared
to reject the notion that its common law origin immunized the statute:
"Common law or codification of it may be overly harsh when viewed in
the light of the Constitution. " 40
36 362 F. Supp. at 1379-81.
The atmosphere created by the New York wage assignment scheme encourages
the finance companies to take unilateral, non-judicial action and compels the
debtor, usually of low income, to capitulate to these pressures, -waiving" certain
rights to get the needed loan and signing away the right to judicial intervention
against the finance company's action, no matter the presence of valid defense or
dispute.... New York's statute makes these wage assignment agreements so advan-
tageous to the finance companies that they are contracts of adhesion....
Id. at 1880.
37id. at 1381, citing Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, 346 F. Supp. 313, 317 n.4
(E.D.N.Y. 1972), revsd and remanded, 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973); Palmer v. Columbia Gas
Co., 342 F. Supp. 241, 246 (N.D. Ohio 1972). The court noted that while an action on a debt
generally requires a judicial examination as to its validity before a state official is autho-
rized to execute upon the property, the statute here in question obviated this procedure
by empowering the creditor to unilaterally decide the existence of the default and levy
upon the property himself.
38 The agreement provided for wage assignment "if there is a default." (emphasis
added). The court deemed these words insufficient to allow the finance company "to
unilaterally and presumptively declare default." 362 F. Supp. at 1388.
39 The court found that:
[t]he New York statutes countenance a legal procedure that can be set in motion by
one party depriving another of his property without a court or state official ever
being aware of it. Neither the Constitution, common law or common sense ratify
this type of procedure.
862 F. Supp. at 1387.
The statute was also deemed vulnerable in that it effected a reversal of the burden of
proof:
Instead of the finance company having to initiate action and prove that there is
a debt and that there has been default thereon, the debtor must initiate the action
and prove the invalidity of the debt. Given the relative economic power and legal
resources of these parties, the anomaly has a particularly harsh effect upon the
debtor.
362 F. Supp. at 1384. The court could not tolerate a procedure which, it felt, forced
resolution of disputes to turn not on the merits but on the relative power of the parties.
Id. See Brown, A Meaningful Opportunity to be Heard, 46 ST. JOHN's L. Rxv. 25, 25-26
(1971).
40362 F. Supp. at 1386. In his dissent in Northside Motors v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617
(Fla. 1973), Judge Ervin was willing to concede the historic roots of creditor seif-help
agreements, but for him antiquity carried a different connotation:
1974]
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Further language in the opinion indicates, moreover, that the
court would have struck down any summary self-help procedure, in-
cluding section 9-503, had that statute been before it:
It is always preferable to determine the merits prior to a taking
and to thereafter allow the taking of property to proceed under
the supervision and by written order of a court, rather than to
statutorily authorize a party in interest to take the property un-
fettered by even an ex parte review by a court.41
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, rejected
the foregoing approach.42 Each of the three theories of state action pre-
sented by the lower court was specifically rejected.
1. Partnership. This theory, the Court opined, generally depended
upon direct government subsidization of private enterprise. Since loan
companies receive no state aid and their facilities are privately owned,
there is no state participation.43
The fact that lending institutions are regulated by a state licensing
scheme was deemed an insufficient state nexus.44 To make state regula-
It is a relic of the past; an instrument of oppression that has no place in modern
society.
What is deprecated herein is statutorily countenanced "self-help" which allows
sellers to contractually suspend prior notice of repossession . . .and to bargain
away the opportunity of the buyer to be judicially heard as to any defenses he
may have. Such extralegal, one-sided statutory grants favoring sellers and lenders
are inimical to due process of law and contrary to good public policy.
282 So. 2d at 628.
41 362 F. Supp. at 1388. The court characterized the wage assignment statute as "a self-
help measure aiding in the collection efforts of the finance companies." Id. at 1882. Earlier
in the opinion, the court compared the wage assignment statute to the innkeeper's lien
laws in the sense that both are ". . . 'indeed only made possible, by explicit state authoriza-
tion.'" Id. at 1379, citing Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 114 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The court
justifies this analogy on the basis that like the innkeeper, the creditor is empowered to
take extrajudicial, unilateral action. Yet the creditor acts pursuant to a statutorily per-
mitted contract as does the repossessor under section 9-503. The innkeeper, on the other
hand, performs what would normally be breaking and entering but for the statutory
safeguard. Contracts attempting to permit the creditor to recover the property in the
manner of an innkeeper executing his statutory lien have been held to constitute breaches
of the peace. See Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934) (creditor entered
debtor's residence in the latter's absence and repossessed the piano).
42Bond v. Dentzer, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1974), revg 362 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D.N.Y. 1973).
43 Burton was distinguished on the ground that the government, in that case, had itself
provided the property on which racial discrimination, particularly offensive by nature,
was practiced by the private restaurant. -F.2d at-.
44 In Wahba v. New York Univ., - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1974), the court noted that if com-
monality of economic interest alone could satisfy the state action test, the state would
have been implicated in Moose Lodge:
. ..such interests existed in a substantial degree in that case itself. The lodge
received from the state permission to operate a lucrative business and obtained a
valuable property right in the liquor license itself; the state, operating a monopoly
system, was provided with a distributor that produced substantial revenue.
- F.2d at -, citing The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 73-74 (1970). See
also Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), where
[Vol. 48:611
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tion alone determinative, the court noted, would be to extend the
state action concept to every corporation licensed by the state, a propo-
sition not asserted even by those advocating the most liberal application
of the concept. "The requisite state action," it was said, "must be re-
lated to the challenged activity.' 45 Finally, the courts are not enlisted,
as in Shelly v. Kraemer,4 6 to enforce an offensive, private covenant.
Here the private agreement seeks to circumvent judicial interposition. 47
2. Encouragement. Wage assignment by private agreement, the
court noted, had always been enforceable at common law without a
prior judicial determination of the merits. Therefore, the state cannot
be deemed to deprive the debtor of anything. On the contrary, the
Legislature, concerned with protecting the debtor from overreaching,
has prescribed by statute many safeguards to "equalize the borrowing
posture" of the debtor who, at common law, had been left at the mercy
of the loan shark.48
3. Traditional State Functions. The Court's study of the common
law directed it to no practice requiring a creditor to first establish his
debt before attaching the wages or requiring the creditor to obtain a
prior court order. Wage assignment, the court said, had always been by
private levy: "In sum the statute has not given the assignee anything
new; it has in fact circumscribed substantially the rights of the creditor
which were untrammeled at common law. '49
Only one month earlier, the Second Circuit, in Shirley v. State
National Bank of Connecticutr0 sustained the constitutionality of self-
help repossession. Shirley involved a challenge to Connecticut's Retail
Sales Financing Act,51 a statute "substantially the same as section 9-503
of the Uniform Commercial Code which permits peaceful repossession
by a secured party upon default." 52 The remedy was invoked against
the buyer by seizing her automobile pursuant to a contractual provi-
pervasive regulation of the liquor trade provided substantial revenues for the state. By
contrast, the state was said to derive no revenue from the licensing of lenders nor did the
state confer any monopoly privileges on the lending institutions. - F.2d at-.
45 Id. at-.
46 334 US. 1 (1948).
47A court may intervene, under the wage assignment statute, only when requested by
assignor, his employer, or any party in interest, to vacate the assignment. N.Y. PErs. PROP.
LAw § 47-e (McKinney 1973).
48Among the more significant safeguards prescribed in the statute are minimum
print size in the agreement and maximum interest rates chargeable; furthermore, the
limit of assignable wages is fixed at 10% of earnings, and assignment is prohibited unless
earnings exceed a specified dollar amount. Id. § 47 et seq.
49- F.2d at- (2d Cir. 1974).
Gold. at -(2d Cir. 1974).
1 42 CoNN. GEN. STAT. Ray. §§ 42-83 et seq. (West 1973).
52- F.d at- (2d Cir. 1974).
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sion. In determining that no state action was present, the court em-
phasized the purely private nature of the agreement. Since the State
"plays no significant role" in its execution, the Moose Lodge test was
not satisfied.
A theory of state action based upon statutory authorization was
rejected. The origin of self-help repossession was traced to Greek and
Roman law; so firmly embedded had the remedy become in common
law tradition that it existed even absent its provision by contract. More-
over, far from generating a new creditor right, the statutory scheme
under review was regarded as extending significant protection to the
consumer by regulating finance charges and prohibiting confession of
judgment clauses: ". .. the State does not encourage seizure, nor does
it in any way aid or abet the seller. The partnership, if any, is with the
purchaser and not the [seller]." 53
The court expressed particular concern for protecting the codifica-
tion of common law in the commercial law area:
New York has a Law Revision Commission, for example, which
is charged with this responsibility; were the mere codification of
common law sufficient to constitute significant state involvement,
then, of course, the door to Fourteenth Amendment intrusion
would be opened wide to continuing federal scrutiny. We find no
support for this proposition in the precedents which bind us.54
Shirley thus advanced three basic propositions which were later applied
in the Bond decision: (1) the fact of legislation alone is insufficient
state intrusion for fourteenth amendment purposes, especially where
the enactment is a mere codification of a right long recognized under
the common law;55 (2) the legislative scheme, to constitute state action,
must be related to the private conduct under attack; 50 and (3) racial
discrimination, under Reitman, is an area requiring a lesser degree of
state intrusion for state action purposes than the field of commercial
transactions.57 Thus, in determining the issue of state action, the factors
to be weighed in the balance are not only the degree of government
involvement but "the offensiveness of the conduct, and the value of
53 Id. at-.
54 Id. at-.
55 Rather than depriving the debtor of anything by conferring a new right on the
creditor, both the New York and Connecticut statutes were viewed as providing the debtor
with additional protection not enjoyed at common law.
56 - F.2d at-.
57 The Bond court further distinguished Reitman on the ground that the amendment
there enacted was regressive, having repealed prior fair housing laws and prevented subse-
quent change. By contrast, article 3A accorded the debtor greater rights than before and
erected no constitutional barrier to further change.
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preserving a private sector free from constitutional requirements ap-
plicable to government institutions." 58
Judge Kaufman dissented in both cases, relying upon the approach
of the Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut."9 Boddie reasoned that
a non-consensual taking could be lawfully accomplished only by the
state since the state is deemed to have a "monopoly over techniques
for binding conflict resolution."60 Only where there is mutual consent
can the parties resort to private conflict resolution. The authorization
of self-help in a contract of adhesion, Judge Kaufman urged, is in-
sufficient to supply this element of consent. 61 The seizure, then, amounts
to a unilateral, non-consensual taking, often without even the knowl-
edge of the other party. Thus, he concluded, a creditor who may law-
fully seize property without the holder's consent must be deemed to
act pursuant to a state delegation of its monopoly power and is subject
to the restraints of due process.62
In upholding self-help repossession, the Second Circuit has adopted
the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Adams v.
Southern California National Bank.63 The appeal therein had pressed
resolution of differing conclusions reached by two California district
courts concerning the due process rights of debtors whose automobiles
had been repossessed pursuant to security agreements authorized under
section 9-503. 04 The court found insufficient state involvement to trigger
application of the due process clause and thus avoided adjudication of
the due process claim.65
68-F.2 at- It is significant to note that both Bond and Shirley were decided by a
split vote, the three judges consistently aligned around the state action question, Judges
Mfansfield and Mulligan found no state action in each and Judge Kaufman dissented. The
result points up the similarity between the two remedies under review: neither statutory
scheme required interposition by an organ of the state, either judicial or administrative, and
in both cases the right of seizure had arisen pursuant to private agreement between the
parties and was one that had long been recognized under common law.
GO401 U.S. 371 (1971).
00- F.2d at--, citing 401 U.S. at 375.
61 Judge Kaufman, dissenting in Bond, urged that the wage assignment here sanc-
tioned was equivalent in effect to the wage garnishment proscribed in Sniadach:
Indeed, by following the "consensual" path hewn by the majority, we go far toward
eviscerating the salient teaching of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.... con-
cerning the injustices which arise from "prejudgment garnishment whereby the
sole opportunity to be heard comes from the taking."
- F.2d at - (citations omitted). Judge Kaufman also rejected the distinction proffered by
the majority based on the ministerial role of the court clerk in Sniadach in issuing the
ex parte summons. Id. at
62- F.d at -.
63-F.2d-(th Cir. 1975).
64 See Adams v. Egley, 38 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Hampton v. Bank of Cal., -
F. Supp. - (ND. Cal. 1970).
65 California had prescribed by comprehensive statutory scheme many of the terms
to be included in and procedures to be followed under a retail installment sales contract.
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The court deemed racial discrimination cases inapposite for reso-
lution of the state action question in the self-help area. 6 Yet it cited
Moose Lodge for the proposition that even in the equal protection area,
a comprehensive state regulatory system, in and of itself, is insufficient
to constitute state action. 67
The Adams court noted that in security agreements providing for
the self-help remedy, the creditor needs no benediction from the state.
Even repeal of section 9-503 would leave the parties free to provide for
the remedy in their contractual undertaking. The ultimate source of
the right to repossess and resell, stressed the court, is in the common
law security agreement and not in the Code.08 Repossession is thus an
individual invasion of rights and not subject to the fourteenth amend-
ment. 69
The "partnership" theory advanced by the district court in Bond
was rejected by the majority, which failed to find anything approaching
the "symbiotic relationship" present in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority,70 where the state and private enterprise had combined for
mutual economic benefit. The landlord's lien statutes were distin-
guished on the ground that they delegated a traditional state function
to the landlord and allowed him to seize the tenant's private property 7'
The significant state involvement alleged by the debtors was this authorization and
encouragement of self-help repossessions. But the court felt that the mere sanction of
summary seizure by private parties with no request for state participation and without
official action or review did not meet the requirements of Moose Lodge.-F.2d at-.
06 Id. at-.
67 Of greater relevance, the court felt, were those cases dealing with the right of a
power company to arbitrarily terminate service. To the extent that utilities are controlled
by the state and enjoy the monopolistic benefits the state confers upon them, they are
deemed to perform a legitimate state function. When the utility exercises the authority
given it by the state to enter private property and disconnect service or remove equipment,
such activity has been held to constitute state action. Id. at-, citing, inter alia, Palmer v.
Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973). However, the court approved a Seventh
Circuit decision which found no state action when the utility merely terminated service
from its own headquarters, and culled from the court's opinion: "Affirmative support must
be significant, measured by its contribution to the effectiveness of defendant's conduct, or
perhaps its defiance of conflicting national policy...."-F.2d at-, citing Lucas v. Wis-
consin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 656 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
68-F.2d at-.
69 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
70 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See note 35 supra.
71- F.2d at-. Ift landlord lien situations, there is no contractual authorization. The
landlord's conduct amounts to what would ordinarily be breaking and entering but for
the statutory safeguard.
This lien was termed in Blye a "hangover from the bygone days," originally given
to the innkeeper in exchange for the duty of absolute care imposed upon him, which obliga-
tion has since been abrogated by statute, and his duty not to refuse anyone service. 33
N.Y.2d at 22, 300 N.E.2d at 715, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 177. See Navagh, A New Look at the Li-
ability of Inn Keepers For Guest Property Under New York Law, 25 FoRDHAm L. REv. 62,
63 (1956).
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The court adopted the view of the minority in Fuentes that the
holding there would permit private repossession where no arm of the
state was involved:
It would appear that creditors could withstand attack under today's
opinion simply by making clear in the controlling credit instru-
ments that they may retake possession without a hearing, or, for
that matter, without resort to judicial process at all.72
Indeed strong policy considerations militate in favor of preserving
creditor self-help remedies in the field of commercial transactions. In
implementing these policies, courts will be reluctant to find sufficient
state involvement and thereby avoid the due process issue entirely.
Judges tend to be pragmatists; they realize that, to a very great ex-
tent, our economy is built on credit. According to Standard and
Poore's [sic] Statistical Summary, as of August, 1973 the outstand-
ing consumer debt in this nation amounted to $172 billion. Ob-
viously, creditors are unlikely to continue making loans unless they
can be reasonably assured of collecting the debt.73
Important, too, is the fact that under the standard installment sales
contract the creditor retains title to the goods until the price has been
paid in full. While the seller's security interest may be said to decrease
upon each payment, the interest he retains is in the specific goods he
seeks to repossess. Moreover, often a seller's only means of salvaging the
contract price from a defaulting buyer is by timely seizure of the goods
themselves.
It has been argued that forcing creditors into court will jeopardize
the marketing of credit and will result in increased costs to be passed
on to the consumer;74 and, once in court, a creditor, formerly satisfied
with the collateral alone, will find it in his interest to press for a de-
ficiency judgment7 5 Also to be considered is the effect of this litigation
on already congested court calendars.
Yet procedural due process is not to be bartered away in the name
of efficiency or economy.7 6 Where the state is sufficiently involved, the
It has also been argued that the lien falls hardest on permanent residents and pro-
vides little protection against the transient who defaults and absconds. Blye v. Globe-
Wernicke Realty Co., 83 N.Y.2d 15, 21, 800 N.E.2d 710, 714, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 176 (1973).
72- F.2d at-, citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 102 (1972) (Burger, C.J., White &
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
7823 DMNSE L.J. 28 (1974).
74-F.2d at-.
75 J. WEra & R. SUrsmss, U ro2m CoAnr cLAL CODE 974, 975 (1972).
76 As justice Stewart wrote in Fuentes: "Procedural due process is not intended to pro-
mote efficiency or accommodate all possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular
interests of the person whose possessions are about to be taken." 407 U.S. at 90 n.22.
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message of Fuentes and its progeny seems clear: notice and a hearing
are required before the deprivation of any significant property in-
terest.77
Judicial reluctance to per se invalidate section 9-503 will not pro-
tect the creditor in situations of obvious overreaching. In D. H. Over-
myer Co. v. Frick,7s a cognovit clause, the product of equal bargaining
between two corporations represented by counsel, was upheld, but the
Supreme Court cautioned:
Our holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other facts
of other cases. For example where the contract is one of adhesion,
where there is great disparity in bargaining power and where the
debtor receives nothing for the ... clause, other legal consequences
may ensue3 9
The case is cited in Adams as confirming the proposition that in certain
instances, summary repossession without notice and an opportunity for
a hearing may be unconscionable and void as a matter of public policy.
Ultimate resolution of the constitutionality of section 9-503 in
light of recent developments in the area of summary creditor remedies
probably lies with the Supreme Court.80 Whether the sweep of Fuentes
will reach this area will depend, to large degree, upon the Court's per-
ception of the practical consequences of invalidating this procedure.8'
77 Some feel that Fuentes casts doubt upon the constitutionality of all self-help repos-
sessions, common law in origin or codified. See, e.g., Fontain v. Industrial Natl Bank,
298 A.2d 521, 523 n.3 (R.I. 1973). Ronald Anderson, in his work on the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, has concluded in reference to section 9-503:
If the trend of protecting consumers and indigent persons continues, it is believed
that it will be held unconstitutional, unlawful, contrary to public policy or uncon-
scionable for a creditor to repossess the collateral without affording the debtor some
opportunity to be heard.... Revolutionary as is the conclusion that repossession
is unlawful, it is believed that the conclusion is an inevitable and logical develop-
ment from the Fuentes decision.
2 R. ANDERsow, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 133 (Cumulative Supp. 1972).
78405 U.S. 174 (1972).
79 Id. at 188.
80 The Court recently agreed to review questions of standing and mootness in relation
to Illinois' self-help automobile repossession statute. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees
Credit Union, 42 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1974) (No. 78-858). A three-judge district
court for the Northern District of Illinois had held that a debtor whose automobile had
been repossessed lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality
of the repossession provision of the Uniform Commercial Code since he had an alternative
remedy of suing in conversion, and that his claim for injunctive relief was moot because
the automobile had already been repossessed and sold.
81 In his dissent in Fuentes, Mr. Justice White poignantly argued:
It is very doubtful in my mind that such a hearing would in fact result in protec-
tions for the debtor substantially different from those the present laws provide.
On the contrary, the availability of credit may well be diminished or, in any event,
the expense of securing it increased.
None of this seems worth the candle to me .... The Uniform Commercial
Code . . . now . . . pervasively governs the subject matter with which it deals....
Recent studies have suggested changes in Art. 9 in this respect .... I am content
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If its attendant abuses are deemed to outweigh the advantages it holds
for creditors and consumers alike, its demise is inevitable.
to rest on the judgment of those who have wrestled with these problems so long
and often and upon the judgment of the legislatures that have considered and so
recently adopted provisions that contemplate what has happened in these cases.
407 U.S. at 103.
As this article goes to press, it appears the Supreme Court has significantly withdrawn
from its stance in Fuentes. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. 42 US.L.W. 4671 (U.S. May 13,
1974) (No. 72-6160), the Court upheld the Louisiana sequestration statute which allows
ex parte seizure of chattals without notice or prior hearing. Fuentes was limited to require
a hearing before a final deprivation of property and was distinguished by the majority on
the following grounds: (1) the Louisiana procedure, in the particular parish in which the
case arose, provides for issuance of the sequestration writ by a judge rather than a clerk
of the court; (2) a plaintiff must make a more convincing showing by filing an affidavit
reciting "specific facts" to justify the seizure rather than a mere conclusory statement as
to the merits of the plaintiff's claim; (3) an immediate hearing is provided under the
Louisiana procedure, followed by immediate dissolution of the writ if the plaintiff fails
to meet his burden of proof; and (4) a plaintiff is required to file a bond to protect the
debtor from any possible loss (including deprivation of use) if the seizure proves wrong-
ful.
The Court felt Sniadach was inapposite. The Court viewed wages as sui generis and
their garnishment as particularly amenable to creditor abuse. Further, the Court noted
that garnishment is invoked against property in which the creditor had no prior interest,
whereas, in Mitchell, both the creditor and the debtor had interests in the chattels.
To the extent that Fuentes had required a hearing prior to even a temporary de-
privation of any property interest, Justice Powell, concurring, deemed Fuentes to have
been overruled. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4678. Three of the four dissenting justices viewed Mitchell
as "indistinguishable" from Fuentes and as undermining the principle of stare decisis.
42 U.S.L.W. at 4680, 4682.
The decision purported not to affect garnishment, "self-help," or other summary
remedies over which, the Court said, commentators are still "in the throes of debate." 42
U.S.L.W. at 4677 n.13.
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